ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
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ECONOMIC PROBLEMS: ECONOMIC PROBLEMS http://www.bized.co.uk/images/bize...: "The Economic Problem NotesEconomics NotesThe Economic Problem What Do These Notes Cover?To have a look at the mind map for this r..."
Sunday, January 16, 2011
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The Economic Problem NotesEconomics NotesThe Economic Problem
How do we sum up the basic economic problem? We all suffer from it and spend most of our lives trying to resolve it. Essentially, the economic problem stems from the fact that as humans, we have unlimited wants and needs. A need is something that can be seen as being essential to survival, such as food, water, shelter and warmth. A want is something that we would like to have but which is not essential to survival - a car, the latest version of the PlayStation, that new top you have seen in Top Shop, the mobile phone with all the latest gadgets on etc. The problem is that the world and every individual in it have limited resources in relation to the wants and needs we have. We never have enough money to get what we 'want'. There are never enough resources to make sure the health service works properly; teachers and lecturers will always moan about how they never have enough resources to do their job properly. In recent times, we have heard much about the problems faced by the armed forces in conflict zones around the world 'not having the tools to get the job done'. There have been plenty of news items in recent years about the lack of resources available to the military in dangerous conflict zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan. If we were to increase the number of soldiers, equipment and weapons available to the military, it would have consequences elsewhere. The government has limited funds from taxes, which have to be spent on a wide range of things - if we diverted more funds to the military, there would have to be cuts elsewhere in the government's spending programme - or a rise in taxes. Copyright: Dragon MasterGunner, from stock.xchng. All these things are symptomatic of the tension between scarce resources and unlimited wants and needs. That is what the economic problem is all about. At this stage, you might point to the fact that countries like the UK and the United States produce massive amounts of waste every year. You might look at the food that is wasted in restaurants, fast food outlets and even the school canteen every day to wonder why there is so much wasted food, with so many people in the world hungry and on the verge of starvation. Part of the problem is the fact that resources are not distributed evenly between countries and societies. The terms 'wants' and 'needs' are also relative terms. 'I really, really want a Ferrari' might be the comment of an individual in the UK; 'I really, really want to be able to walk only two miles to get the daily ration of water for my household' might be the cry of an individual in the Sudan. To each individual, they are both important - we might be able to point out that the Ferrari is not really that necessary; a Smart car will do just as well! Wants, needs and scarce resources - all part of the economic problem. Wants and needs are relative - my burning want might be very different from the wants of someone like the boy in the image above. Copyright: Luca Biagiotti from stock.xchng, Andrew Ashwin, and Luc Sesselle from stock.xchng. Resources is a specific term used a great deal in economics. It describes all the things available at our disposal that can be used to satisfy our needs. This therefore includes things like our income, which is simply a means of acquiring a range of goods and services. Resources therefore might be the food we buy at shops, clothing, houses, cars, entertainment, metal, minerals, oil, timber, gas, plastics and so on. In economics, these resources are normally classified into three or four categories. These are:
This factory uses a large amount of capital in the production process - there are the buildings that form the factory, all the machines that are used in production and all the equipment needed to make sure the machines and the production process operates smoothly. However, what it also needs is labour, raw materials, land and enterprise to make it all work properly. Copyright: Wena, fromstock.xchng.
Regardless of the task, the human resource of labour comes in many different forms. Labour offers its services in exchange for a reward or price - wages. Copyright: Cristina Ortigoso, Mitchell Powell, Joseph Zlomek and Francesco Pacilli, all from stock.xchng. If we had an unlimited supply of resources at our disposal we would be able to meet any want or need. The problem is, we do not have unlimited resources at our disposal. We therefore have to make choices. Economics, could, therefore, be described as the science of choice. Choices are made at many different levels.
All these examples highlight the problem of scarce resources in relation to wants and needs. When we are faced with these choices, we have to go through some quite sophisticated decision making. We might not always be aware that we are making sophisticated decisions but in reality we are. Such decision making is at the heart of the subject of economics and tells us something about how humans try to tackle the economic problem. |
Adam Smith - Virtual Economy
Economists - Adam Smith (1723-90)
Adam Smith is often seen as the founding father of economics. He developed much of the theory about markets that we regard as standard theory now. In fact he could be seen as being to blame for much of the content of current economics courses!
Adam Smith was Scottish and after graduating from Glasgow (at the amazing age of 17!!) he was a fellow at Oxford and then he lectured back in Scotland again - first at Edinburgh and then Glasgow Universities. Surprisingly this was not in economics. In fact it was not until 10 years after leaving the Chair of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow that he wrote the book (or series of books) for which he is most famous. After Glasgow, he decided to go travelling. Almost certainly this was not backpacking and sleeping out in stations as he spent much of this time meeting the influential thinkers of the day. It was this that helped him to formulate his ideas, and once he got back to Scotland again, he started writing.
Nobel Prize Winners 2005 - Robert Aumann and Thomas Schelling
A GamePlay this game and see what happens. Get into a group; you will need some envelopes, some scrap paper and a pen. Imagine that each of you has a different amount of money that comprises your personal wealth. You are required to contribute a sum of money, however, to the common good. Write down a sum of money, which could be from £0 upwards to the top of your wealth limit, which you are prepared to donate to the common good. Your teacher or group organiser will then double the total amount contributed and share it out equally amongst everyone in the group. Your teacher will tell you how much each person will get at the end of the round. Now play the game again - what will your strategy be this time? Your teacher/group leader will allow you to play the game several more times. As each round progresses, notice what happens to your behaviour and also what happens to the behaviour of those in your group. Game TheoryThis simple game reveals a great deal about human nature. For some time now, economists have been interested in game theory and its application to a wide range of situations that are highly relevant to economic analysis. Economists like to think they belong to a tradition that values scientific methodology but there is one big problem facing the subject, which is that economics is a social science and as such is dealing with human behaviour. Human behaviour is not predictable in the same way that force, momentum or light might be. This does not stop economists looking what is called the law of large numbers and offering some considerable insight into the way in which economies work and how humans behave. The latest winners of the Nobel Prize for Economics have spent much of their lives investigating game theory and their research has some fascinating implications for policy makers and for analysis a series of economic issues. Robert J. Aumann (left) and Thomas C. Schelling (right) received their awards for the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in memory of Alfred Nobel at the Stockholm Concert Hall, December 10th 2005. Copyright:Nobel Web AB 2005 Robert J. Aumann was born in Germany in 1930 and is the Emeritus Professor at the Centre for Rationality at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His background is in mathematics and he gained his PhD in mathematics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1955. His work has been in the field of game theory and specifically the effect of how cooperation can be of benefit, as a result of the research carried out into repeated games. In such circumstances, the short run benefits may be outweighed by the longer-term benefits of cooperation rather than individual optimisation. Thomas C. Schelling was born in 1921 and was Emeritus Professor in the Department of Economics and School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland. Schelling's contribution to game theory was set against the backdrop of the Cold War and the tensions between the West and the East and the nuclear arms race. His research on strategies has helped build understanding of conflict and conflict resolution in spheres as diverse as nuclear war and market structure. Both Prize winners' ideas and research have helped provide a framework for a greater understanding of human behaviour. We see the potential for applying their ideas every day, as well as in high-profile events such as the G8 summit, the trade talks and Mr Blair's performance at the EU budget summit in December 2005. Conflict and StrategyWhen we look at human behaviour, there is a potential to think of it in terms of evolutionary biology - the survival of the fittest - and extrapolate from this an assumption that humans are selfish individuals who all act to maximise their own self-interest. Adam Smith, of course, suggested that if this were the case, then by definition the welfare of society as a whole would improve - the so-called invisible hand. Conflict has been a feature of human life ever since humans first walked the planet. However, it is equally the case that cooperation between humans can lead to benefits to the participants that are greater than the cost of the cooperation. In essence, therefore, every decision we make involves some potential pay-off but might also involve some sacrifice. If we are all acting as rational beings, then we might seek to maximise our pay-offs and minimise our sacrifices. The classic scenario on which this analysis is based is the 'Prisoners' Dilemma'. The following is a summary of this scenario. The Prisoners' DilemmaTwo people are detained by the authorities on suspicion of committing a crime. The two are separated and then offered a series of choices by the authorities.
Put yourself in this situation - which choice would you make? For Player A, select either 'confess' or 'Do not confess'. The animation will then select a response for Player B. When that response is highlighted, you will be given the result on the screen! Try again to see all the options. (Nb. if nothing appears below you should make sure your Flash player is up to date.
This is referred to as a non-zero sum game. The decision of one protagonist does not mean there can be no benefit for the other. In a zero-sum game, increasing the benefit for one would lead to a corresponding loss for the other - there is always a winner and a corresponding loser. Schelling's work was based on the premise that the vast majority of instances of social interaction involved multiple individuals or groups with each having a mix of common interest and conflict. Schelling identified two aspects of game theory - non-cooperative game theory and cooperative game theory.
The other main concept we need at this point is that of the Nash Equilibrium. John Nash was another Nobel Prize Winner in 1994 and carried out research into strategies and solutions in game theory. A Nash Equilibrium exists if, in a non-cooperative game, there is no incentive for any player to change his or her strategy to achieve any benefit to them. There would only be a reason to change strategy if the player thought they could make some gain whilst other players kept their choices unchanged. The resulting pay-offs and the set of strategies constitutes a Nash Equilibrium. Chicken or Hawk/Dove GamesThe background to Schelling's work mentioned earlier is important. Schelling looked at the issue of bargaining - bargaining entails some form of conflict of interest but in essence each player will be looking to maximise their returns, whilst knowing at the same time that some agreement is preferable to no agreement at all. In this scenario, how does a player manage to influence the negotiations in order to move towards his or her preferred outcome without upsetting the other players and thus failing to secure any agreement - an outcome which would be disadvantageous to all concerned, including the player? Schelling proposed that it might be in the interests of the player to worsen his or her own options in order to gain some sort of concession from another player. Mr Blair, for example, might have had a much freer hand in the EU Budget negotiations if he had not made a firm declaration earlier in the year that the issue of the rebate was not up for discussion. In making such a pronouncement he sent a clear message to the EU that he would not budge on this issue and this affects the subsequent negotiating stance of the rest of the EU members. However, in doing this Mr Blair also set himself up for considerable difficulties at home - any movement on the rebate could be seized upon by his political opponents at home as a sign of weakness. In such cases, the other EU members would know that if Mr Blair was to move on the rebate issue then it would bring great political costs to him personally and thus by moving on this, Mr Blair might have been more likely to elicit concessions from the rest of the EU on other matters than if he had made a statement at the outset that the rebate was up for negotiation, provided he got some concessions from the others! Where difficulties arise is if both parties to a conflict make commitments that are seen as being irreversible and incompatible. The result could be stalemate and potential serious conflict. The current dispute with Iran over its nuclear programme might be looked at in this light. Schelling illustrated some of the dilemmas through a simple example of two countries in conflict over a piece of land. Each country could make a decision to mobilise its troops and attack the other. The alternative would be not mobilising and thus seeking some peaceful solution to the conflict. The payoff to each country if both decide to mobilise is 0. If both decide to seek a peaceful solution, the payoff will be split between the two and will be positive. If, however, one country mobilises but the other does not, the aggressor can take complete control of the land and achieve a positive payoff that is greater than that achieved through peaceful agreement. For the other country, losing the land is bad but not as bad as all-out war - the result of both mobilising. The optimum strategy, therefore, is mixed. One is for a country not to mobilise if it thinks the other country is going to; another is for one country to mobilise if it thinks the other country will not. The outcome might depend on the degree to which each country understands the position of the other. In most 'game' situations, the protagonists know something about the position of the other - but not everything. However, if there is any perceived chink in the armour of the other player and this is detected by the other, then there is a potential benefit to follow the hard route. This is why this sort of game is referred to as 'chicken' or 'hawk/dove'. DeterrenceSchelling further included other complications to the analysis by looking at how the strategies of each player would change in light of threats and action. One of the key features of Cold War strategy was the use of the terms 'first strike' and 'second strike capability'. 'If you send one missile to my land, I will strike back with 20 missiles on yours'. Such a deterrence might influence decision-making - but only if it is credible. In establishing such a deterrence, Schelling also noted that there could be an impact on the perception by other players of the country's interests and intentions, i.e. is this a deterrence strategy or an intention to get a first strike capability where you act and succeed in knocking out the other country's capacity to retaliate, therefore gaining a positive payoff? How do you interpret the build up of missiles by a prospective opponent? As a means of deterrence or the capability to launch an aggressive attack? Is Iran's work on its nuclear programme purely for energy purposes or is the country aiming to get the technology to allow it to build nuclear weapons? Knowing the intentions of your opponent may not be as straightforward as it seems. © Dave Gotisha, Stock.Xchng. Having confidence in knowing what your opponent will do in different circumstances, therefore, is vital if some form of equilibrium outcome is to be secured. Country 1 adopts the strategy of not mobilising unless Country 2 chooses to do so. What does Country 2 now do? It knows that if it mobilises then Country 1 will also mobilise - the payoff is zero. Country 2 therefore would be better off choosing not to mobilise. Schelling referred to such a situation as 'a balance of terror'. This translated into the idea of mutually assured destruction (MAD) and inspired the establishment of a hotline between the Kremlin and the White House following the Cuban Missile Crisis. BrinksmanshipIn analysing intentions and outcome, each player will be basing their decisions on some form of probability assessment. What is the probability that your opponent will mobilise? What is the probability that your opponent will retaliate to your actions? In such cases, Schelling noted the use of 'brinkmanship' - providing your opponent with a gradually increasing probability of zero payoff. A key to successful brinkmanship is to up the ante each time by only a small step. It pays, therefore, to keep your opponent guessing as to your intentions. This might certainly be an analysis that could be applied to the way in which Tony Blair approached the negotiations at the EU Budget meeting. At the heart of game theory is the necessity of assessing the costs and the benefits of a strategy - not too difficult a concept in essence, but extremely powerful in reality. Schelling then turned his attention to the issue of what happens to strategic decision-making in the long term as opposed to just a short-term view. Decisions made now might have an impact on the future state of negotiations between different parties. Mr Blair suggested that getting a budget deal now was important because it helped set the scene for future negotiations about the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The incentive to forge an agreement and then renege on that agreement i.e. cheat, might be strong. However, Schelling noted that parties will need to recognise that the costs to them of cheating and gaining some short term benefit (which may be much greater) is far outweighed by the costs to them in the longer term of the destruction of the trust that results from cheating. The relationships between players will need to be assessed in the context of repeated playing of the game over a period of time. Certainly, the negotiations on the EU budget have not ended with the agreement in December 2005. The issue will come up again and the parties, whilst not necessarily the same people, will remember what has gone on before and factor this into their decision making. Schelling's Other ContributionsThe work on conflict and aggression that Schelling has worked on established his reputation in the field. However, he continued to work on many other implications of his research, which had an impact on a range of different fields other than war. One such example is his analysis of 'tipping', described as the rapid movement from one equilibrium state to another. One aspect of this is highlighted in immigration policy. Take the East End of London as an example. During the first half of the twentieth century, the East End was largely composed of white British families. The immigration of different ethnic groups and the tendency for such groups to be concentrated into a particular area meant a fairly rapid change in the social structure of the area. In the Tower Hamlets area, for example, the concentration of communities from Bangladesh, India and Pakistan is relatively high. In such circumstances, white communities can quickly find themselves in the minority and this might not be something that the white community would want. In such circumstances there might be significant micro and macro social and economic impacts as a result of this 'tipping'. What might happen is that if there are fears that a community might end up in the minority, they seek to move quickly to get out before this happens. In such a case the impact on property prices, local businesses, how the existing area is left and what effect this has on future investment, schooling, health provision and so on as well as the knock-on effects of the movements elsewhere could be quite dramatic. Schelling also suggested that his ideas could be applied to other areas of social policy. Take smoking for example. Smokers impose costs on the health care system and on the social security system (if they are ill and cannot work then they need support). Should the government try to put in place incentives to persuade smokers to give up - such as taxes? If you apply strict economic theory to the issue, the answer is 'no'. The reason? Smokers tend to die younger because of their habit. In so doing, they impose less of a cost on the health system than if they did not smoke and stayed alive longer! It is a simple case of cost and benefit. The benefit to the state of people smoking in terms of the overall costs to the health and social security system is greater than the cost of them giving up. Schelling, himself a smoker who tried to give up over a period of twenty years, argued that despite the apparent logic of this rational analysis, the government in the US should impose taxes on tobacco. His argument was based around the intrapersonal conflicts faced by humans as individuals who do things that they know is not good for them - eating too much and eating the wrong sorts of food, smoking, drinking, exercising too little and not saving enough. In this scenario we are facing a 'game' whereby we face strategic options - to smoke and receive both positive and negative payoffs, or to quit and again receive negative and positive payoffs. The analysis is equally applicable and has relevance to public policy in such circumstances as the research did to military conflict in the 1960s. Witness the current debate over the decision to ban smoking in public places. Long-term CooperationMarket trading can be seen as the repeated playing of financial games. © Photolibrary Group Robert Aumann made his contribution to game theory in a slightly different way. Schelling was noted for the accessibility of his ideas; Aumann's contribution is no less valid but is rooted in a mathematical tradition and as such is not as accessible to the general public. Aumann's most noted contribution is in the field of long-term cooperation around game theory. We have already seen how, in the prisoners' dilemma, the optimum short-term strategy for each player is to betray the other. In so doing, however, they receive a payoff that is worse than if they cooperated and said nothing. Aumann asked the question about what the equilibrium outcome would be if the game were repeated over and over again, with each prisoner trying to maximise the average payoff from each game. In this case, Aumann showed that the equilibrium outcome was to cooperate because any cheating on the agreement in the short term would be punishable by a refusal to cooperate at some point in the future - and both players would know this. Any short-term gains, therefore, are outweighed by longer-term losses. Aumann expressed this through what he referred to as a 'supergame' - that is, looking at the collection of repeated games as a whole game in itself. Aumann's work was extended to look at how groups of players might react in such situations. In a cartel, for example, there is always the tendency or incentive for one firm to break the cartel to seek to gain some advantage in the market. Aumann's work suggested that long-term cooperation could be 'enforced' by the many against the few who might be seeking to defect. The work was extended in subsequent research to try to take into account the strategies players might adopt in repeated games with incomplete information. This provides an incentive to players to hide, or seek to conceal, information from their rivals. Firms are very keen to keep their costs to themselves! If one player does manage to access information about their rivals and has some form of strategic advantage therefore, what is the best way to utilise this knowledge? If this situation arose, would playing your hand to gain short-term benefit reveal that you did actually know more than you were letting on? For the player who does not have the information they would like, could they discover anything about the player's position by reviewing the strategies and decisions made by that player in the past? Such scenarios are relevant to the world of financial markets where the issue of insider trading is always something that the authorities are keen to stamp out. The number of people with access to privileged information about market moves, business plans and strategies does mean that there is potential for many decisions that could have long-term implications for the markets and the businesses involved. Aumann and Schelling's work has a great many applications in everyday life. Trade wars, price wars, negotiations over budgets, wage negotiations, discussions about environmental issues, merger discussions, social policy, monetary policy, fiscal policy, the work of the Competition Commission, EU fisheries debates and oligopolies are just some of the major areas where their work can be applied. Mathematics in Business and EconomicsHealth Economics - Mind your BusinessMathematics in Business and EconomicsIntroductionThis area of Biz/ed looks at mathematics in the context of business and economics. Many students arrive at university to study either economics or business and find that a big barrier to their progress is not the understanding of the economics or business concepts themselves, but the mathematics that goes with it. This resource is aimed at helping those who lack confidence in using mathematics for economics and business by reviewing some of the basics before moving on to look at some more involved problems. The first thing to point out is that maths is very much about confidence and being logical. The confidence comes in knowing what to do when and why. The logical bit is ensuring you treat each part of a calculation in the correct order and laying out your answer clearly. If you struggle with maths then remembering these two points will help to ensure a greater degree of achievement and if you achieve, it helps to build your confidence in tackling more complex problems.
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